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FAR EAST

1.	Recall of ambassadors suggests Chinese Commun	nist policy review:
25X1A	Radio broadcasts from I that Chinese Communist to the USSR, Poland, Bu Germany, North Korea	ambassadors ilgaria, East
	golia are all absent from their posts. The where ambassadors to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the not known. Of the Chinese envoys to Orbit counti ambassador to Rumania is known to be at his pos	abouts of the Viet Minh is ries, only the
	envoys to Soviet bloc states began with the return the ambassador to the USSR just before Stalin's d It suggests that the Chinese Communist leadershiducting a lengthy review of its policies toward oth including the USSR, in the light of developments states.	to Peiping of eath last March. ip has been conner Orbit states,
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			SOUTH ASIA	
		3.	Comment on reported Soviet agreement to negotiate barter deal	
	25X1A	4	The proposed three-year Soviet-Indian barter agreement providing for the exchange of unspecified amounts of Soviet wheat for Indian products could be used by the Soviet Union as an indication of its interest in the well-being of backward nations. The Indian government, meanwhile, probably views such an exchange as a means of showing its neutrality, saving dollar and sterling exchange, and demonstrating its foresight to the Indian people.	
25X 1	1	-	On the basis of past Soviet agreements with India and Afghanistan, it is not likely that the final agreement will be for as long as three years or that it will be fully implemente	d.
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	: Coudi Amabia	monorted consid	ering diplomatic brea	ak with Britain°	
į.	5. <u>Saudi Arabia</u>	reported consta	ering diplomatic brea	IN WITH DITTUIN	
25X1A		Sau	di Arabia is consider	ing breaking diplo-	2:
20/(1/(ic relations with Brit tish stubbornness on		
		tion	•		
X1	sontative tha	the possibility	told a US of a break was being	embassy repre- discussed by	
	King Ibn Sau	and the Foreig	n Ministry.	•	
		The	American charge in	Jidda, in report-	
	the Saudi gov	ernment may ho	rnishing this information pe for a stronger Am	nerican attitude to-	
	ward Britain government	. The charge do nay be exploring	pes, however, believe g more drastic metho	e that the Saudi ods of solving the	
	issue than th	ose presently en	nployed.		
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WESTERN EUROPE

б.	west German officials comment on Soviet note:	

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Experts in the West German Foreign Ministry believe that the Soviet note of 4 August reflects the continued indecision of the present Soviet regime and its in-

ability to deal realistically with the German problem. The only possible success the note might have, in their opinion, would be to widen disagreement between Britain and the US on Far Eastern problems.

The German officials regard the references to German unity and a peace treaty as indicating Soviet agenda conditions for any talks but consider the references to Chinese participation, disarmament, and military bases merely as Soviet counterproposals. In the opinion of these German officials, Moscow will never agree to discussing free elections first.

Comment: The Soviet regime does not appear to want negotiations on the German question at this time and may continue to use such issues as disarmament and military bases to avoid such negotiations.

7.		reaction	to	Soviet	note	pessimistic	and
	cautious:						

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The French government sees the Soviet note of 4 August as indicating "less desire than ever" for East-West talks and as offering no evidence of a willingness

to make concessions on Germany. According to a high Foreign Ministry official, the government believes that the note was designed further to divide the Allies.

The French foresee a prolonged "battle of notes" and consider that the West's reply should be delayed until just before the 6 September West German elections.

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The Foreign Ministry official gave the American embassy no indication of French interest in Chinese participation in East-West talks as a means of broadening the discussion to include Indochina.

Comment: Despite its known interest in promoting any talks with Communist China as a direct means to peace in Indochina, Paris now appears to be awaiting developments on the forthcoming Korean conference before pushing this position.

The French government has previously insisted that it will not push for EDC ratification until the possibility of four-power talks has been thoroughly explored. Hence it may welcome a long period of note exchange as giving it time to prepare for the anticipated parliamentary battle.

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